In an attempt to further control religious expression, Uzbekistan has updated its blacklist of extremist sites and drafted a law to expand the list of related crimes.
By Madina Amin May 04, 2026 
In April, Tashkent once again returned to a familiar priority: counterextremism.
First, on April 6, the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan its blacklist of extremist and terrorist online sources and content. Bringing blacklisted material to Uzbekistan, distributing, or even storing it carries hefty administrative and criminal punishments. The list has grown from almost 1,600 online entries in January 2025 to over 1,800. The highest number of blacklisted sources and content is found on Telegram, with 855 public channels and posts (earlier this year, The Diplomat on Telegram’s growing centrality in Uzbekistan’s counterextremism efforts). For the first time, the updated list now includes banned content from Threads, a platform by Meta in 2023.
Following this, on April 7, the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis a new draft law that expands the list of extremist and terrorist crimes. First Deputy Prosecutor General Bahriddin Valiyev noted a few shortcomings and gaps in present legislation, such as a broad definition of extremism and its intersection with terrorism, lack of an extremist crimes list, and the absence of a mechanism for identifying “informal structures” as extremist. Valieyev also noted the lack of a social rehabilitation system for those who commit extremist crimes.
Uzbekistan’s current law on counterextremism was in 2018. It defined extremism as “an expression of extreme forms of actions aimed at destabilizing the socio-political situation, forcibly changing the constitutional system of the Republic of Uzbekistan, forcibly seizing power and usurping its powers, and inciting national, racial, ethnic, or religious hatred.” Following this law, in 2019Tashkent a blacklist of extremist online materials and sources, at the time it included around 40 entries. Since then, the Supreme court has expanded it at least 80 times.
The Diplomat previously on the growing number of arrests of mostly young adults on charges of distributing or storing online extremist materials. More often than not, these materials are religious speeches and sometimes even religious songs (called nasheed). Sometimes the alleged crime is simply liking a post, but it yields a prison term all the same. The practice continues to this day.
In 2026, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) yet again that Uzbekistan be included on the State Department’s Special Watch List for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom. USCIRF’s annual report noted that “Uzbek officials imprisoned, detained, and fined independent Muslims who deviate from the state’s preferred interpretation of Islam for their peaceful religious activities, particularly religious expression,” through the 2018 law on counterextremism and other laws.
Although it expands some aspects of Uzbekistan’s counterextremism laws, the new draft law also selective elements of liberalization. Under the draft law, first-time offenders involved in the preparation or storage of materials that pose a threat to public safety may be charged with administrative liability instead of criminal. For offenses such as organizing, leading, or participating in “informal structures,” the proposed amendments would introduce differentiated sentencing based on the level of involvement. This replaces the current system, in which all participants face a flat sentence of 10 to 15 years.
On April 28, Uzbekistan’s Legislative Chamber the set of amendments in the second reading and sent it to the Senate for approval. Among others, the amendments now include rewards and protection mechanisms for whistleblowers, adding another layer to Tashkent’s preventive efforts.
These developments, taken together, indicate a growing concern over online content and the engagement of young people with extremist materials. For now, these engagements do not present a direct threat to the regime. However, Tashkent’s approach to perceived threats has long been preventive. The latest amendments continue that pattern: they slightly soften punishment at the lower end while widening the state’s authority to define, monitor, and prosecute extremism.
In practice, Uzbekistan’s counterextremism efforts are becoming more flexible in punishment but more intrusive in scope. While it salvages some young who depart from Tashkent’s centralized Islamic teaching in favor of online preaching, which often leads them to arrest, it still fails to address the core issue: an elastic definition of extremism that leaves religious expression and freedom of speech vulnerable to criminalization.