On the sidelines of the Astana Mining & Metallurgy Congress, the C5+1 aims to deepen cooperation on critical minerals.
By Wilder Alejandro Sánchez June 01, 2026 
The Astana Mining & Metallurgy () Congress is set for June 11-12 in the capital of Kazakhstan. The event will include a Dialogue on Critical Minerals in the C5+1 format; by combining the two platforms, Astana is aiming to institutionalize a transition from the framework agreements of last year’s presidential summit in Washington to more regular events and discussions of specific investment projects. But it is important to understand how the Central Asian states perceive the current global geopolitical situation and the demands of the Great Powers, and how they can navigate it.
The AMM-2026 exhibition will feature speakers and an exhibition hall with company stands. The 2026 exhibition plan includes stands for companies from the United States, Sweden (including the manufacturer Epiroc), Saudi Arabia, China (in particular Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group Co (XCMG)), and the German company Becker Mining. Local companies will also be present: integrated steel and mining company Qarmet, copper producers KAZ Minerals and KazakhMys, and zinc producer KazzInc.
The list of speakers for 2026 has not yet been confirmed, but in 2025, the attendees included Wen Gang, chairman of China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group, and Garth Kirkham, chairman of CRIRSCO (Canada).
This is the second mining conference in Astana in recent months, following the summit in April. Among the speakers at that event were senior government officials, representatives of companies and agencies, as well as Shell and the British Geological Society.
The C5+1 Dialogue on Critical Minerals, which will take place within the framework of the AMM, will build on the momentum of American-Central Asian cooperation initiated in recent years. The first meeting took place in February 2024, during the Biden administration. More than a year later, under the Trump administration, the five Central Asian leaders visited Washington and met with the U.S. president in early November 2025. In a joint statement, the parties confirmed their intention to “continue cooperation” to promote exploration, mining, and refining investments in Central Asia, as well as the development of value-added production, including downstream industries.
The U.S. delegation is expected to be led by Undersecretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and Environment Jacob Helberg. Although the agenda has not yet been published, it is safe to assume the delegation will adhere to the Trump administration’s current transactional diplomatic strategy.
In April, the Astana International Financial Center () announced the launch of the Junior Mining Platform, a specialized platform for attracting investments in early-stage exploration projects. The goal is for the platform is to serve as a bridge between junior mining companies and investors, enabling selected projects to present themselves to potential investors.
There are other important initiatives aimed at reducing U.S. dependence on China by strengthening mining projects and supply chains with partner countries, both near and far, such as Central Asia. An example is the Kaz Resources Inc project in the Karaganda region to develop the North Katpar and Upper Kairakty deposits, where reserves are estimated at around 1.4 million tons of tungsten trioxide. Kaz Resources was formed from the merger of Skyline Builders Group Holding and Cove Kaz Capital Group. Estimated capital expenditures (CAPEX) amount to $1.1 billion.
The project is listed on Nasdaq under the ticker KAZR and is supported by a $900 million credit line from the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) of the United States and up to$700 million in financing from the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The guarantees provided by EXIM and the DFC for the tungsten project could serve as precedents for similar projects regarding lithium, copper, tantalum, and rare earths.
The AIFC notes that 65 percent of Kazakhstan’s territory remains poorly explored geologically, an impressive figure for a country that ranks ninth in the world in terms of area (about 2.7 million square km).
U.S. politicians and agencies, such as the United States Geological Survey (), routinely warn of the strong dependence of U.S. industries on imports of critical raw materials. Other leading organizations regularly point out that dependence on critical minerals poses a threat to U.S. national security, as China has effectively monopolized the industry. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), , recommended encouraging disruptive innovation, recycling, and resource recovery.
From Washington’s perspective, the struggle for access to critical minerals and rare earths is crucial to national security. China accounts for about 70 percent of the world’s rare-earth production. Amid tensions between the great powers, the war in Ukraine, and the recent conflict in Iran, new terms have emerged to describe the era: “Great Power Competition” or “Cold War 2.0.” Therefore, Washington views access to critical minerals as a race.
This global situation creates an asymmetric interdependence: a monopoly in the processing segment can become a trade policy tool. For example, the price shock in the tungsten market in April confirmed the assessment (or perhaps “worries” is a better term) by U.S. regulators of the need for urgent supply diversification. This situation is something that Kazakhstan can capitalize on.
The upcoming C5+1 Dialogue on Critical Minerals in Astana will continue the communications between Central Asian countries and the United States. The agenda is likely to include issues related to geological exploration, promising projects, and existing mining operations for critical minerals and rare earths, which Washington is extremely interested in.
For Western governments, the critical objective of these C5+ dialogues and field projects is to reduce risks and create new supply chains for nations that require critical resources to keep their economies and industries operating. This change in strategy and objectives affects countries that have these much-needed supplies. For example, given recent global changes and tensions, Kazakhstan is moving from being regarded as a neutral transit territory in Central Asia to becoming a more active participant in developing reliable, shock-resistant supply chains for critical minerals.
For Central Asia in general, and Kazakhstan in particular, many issues are converging simultaneously: there is a structural crisis of the old export model; global emergencies like COVID, Ukraine, and the crisis of the Strait of Hormuz all within one decade add a level of unpredictability for supply chains, while there is a growing Western demand for non-Chinese sources of critical minerals. All these issues are occurring in parallel; thus pragmatic, cautious forecasting of market demand and rational government strategies are necessary.