Without a sustained and coordinated push, the United States risks being locked out of one of the most consequential supply chains shaping the future of global power.
By Edward Lemon and April 30, 2026 
The United States is losing the race for Central Asia’s critical minerals. The region is a treasure trove of minerals crucial to modern economic development. The region’s largest country, Kazakhstan, is already a global powerhouse of critical minerals, with 5,000 deposits at $46 trillion by the World Bank.
Last November, the of the five Central Asian republics met with the U.S. President Donald Trump as part of the 10-year anniversary of the C+5 grouping launched by then-President Barack Obama in 2015 to coordinate relations with this strategic part of the world. In 2023, then-President Joe Biden the group at the U.N. General Assembly.
This flurry of diplomatic activities has produced some eye-catching deals. At meetings in September and November 2025, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed $64 billion in deals with American companies. However, most of these agreements were to buy American goods, including new Boeing jets and new trains. Fewer of the deals resulted in beneficial investments in Central Asia, including a new factory in Kazakhstan to produce 3,000 of John Deere agricultural machinery.
Meanwhile, U.S. rivals Russia and China continue to dominate the region’s lucrative critical minerals and hydrocarbon sectors. At Oxus Society, we have been Moscow and Beijing’s investments, finding that China accounts for 49 percent and Russia for one-fifth of critical mineral exports from Central Asia. In contrast, EU countries account for 6.4 percent of critical mineral exports, and the United States just 2.1 percent.
As the race to dominate artificial intelligence and green energy accelerates, the United States’ failure to secure access to Central Asia’s critical minerals risks ceding the material foundations of next-generation power to its rivals.
A Missed Opportunity
It is hard to overstate the importance of Central Asia to the critical minerals supply chain, as the region accounts for a substantial share of total proven reserves and has significant growth potential. The region has supplies of at least 32 of the now critical minerals identified by the U.S. government.
Kazakhstan has been the world’s largest uranium producer since 2009, supplying over 40 percent of global uranium output in 2025. In early April 2025, geologists in Kazakhstan the discovery of a mineral field in the Karaganda region with an estimated 1 to 20 million metric tons of rare-earth elements. Minerals believed to be present included neodymium, cerium, lanthanum, and yttrium, used in magnets, electric cars, wind turbines, and smartphones. If proven, this would make Kazakhstan the third-largest source of critical minerals in the world.
Uzbekistan holds significant, largely untapped deposits of critical minerals, including tungsten, copper, lithium, vanadium, scandium, yttrium, niobium, tantalum, uranium, rhenium, molybdenum, graphite, titanium, and germanium. In March 2025, the government a $2.6-billion initiative to develop the country’s substantial mineral resources at 76 sites.
Mountainous Tajikistan, meanwhile, has significant mineral resources, with over 600 documented deposits of around 50 minerals, including silver, gold, lead, lithium, nickel, and zinc. It is the second-largest producer of antimony, a vital material for batteries and various defense technologies, accounting for one quarter of global production.
Despite this, U.S. investment here has been paltry. The United States accounts for just 2.1 percent of critical mineral imports from Central Asia, with the lion’s share of that being silver imports from Kazakhstan.
Outflanked by Russia and China
While the U.S. sits on the sidelines, Russia and China are rapidly expanding their holdings. Globally, China 70 percent of extraction and 87 percent of processing. The picture is similar in Central Asia. According to the at the Oxus Society, Central Asia exports over $15 billion in critical minerals per year. China accounts for just under half of these exports. It is the leading importer of Kyrgyz antimony, used in alloys, Kazakh copper, niobium, tungsten, zirconium, and selenium.
Beyond individual projects, China now holds a of mining permits in countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, underscoring its structural dominance in upstream extraction. Crucially, these investments are closely tied to logistics and processing networks that channel raw materials eastward, meaning Central Asia often exports unprocessed ore to China, where higher-value refining occurs, reinforcing Beijing’s not just as an investor but as the central node in Eurasian mineral supply chains.
Russia one-fifth of Central Asia’s critical minerals, many of which are processed in Russia. Kazakhstan is the second-largest producer of chromium, a key ingredient in stainless steel production, in the world. Yet nearly all its output is exported to Russia for production. Central Asian minerals, particularly Kazakhstan’s chromium, play an indirect but essential role in Russian arms production by supplying the metallurgical inputs for heat-resistant alloys used across aircraft, missiles, and armored systems.
Through Rosatom, Russia large stakes in Kazakh mines, including Budenovskoye, where it controls almost one-third of production. Rosatom the contract to build Kazakhstan’s first nuclear plant in 2025. Russia almost half of Kazakhstan’s uranium, much of which is used for enrichment and export. Russia also controls nearly 50 percent of global enrichment capacity.
The region could instead be advancing the United States’ own security sector. According to a recent by the Washington think tank Caspian Policy Center, Central Asia has substantial deposits of missiles critical to precision-guided artillery systems and microchips. These include Uzbekistan’s underexploited gallium and germanium deposits. Titanium and beryllium, vital for jet engines, airframes (including F‑16s and other fighters), and space or missile systems, are abundant in Kazakhstan, according to the same report.
How the U.S. Can Respond
Recent developments show the potential to improve American standing as U.S. companies ramp up investments in the region. The Biden administration launched a via the State Department’s C5+1 in 2024. The Trump administration has intensified emphasis on critical minerals deals in its approach to the region. The administration over $14 billion in deals for critical minerals in its first year in office. Critical minerals were of the agenda when all five Central Asian presidents came to the White House in November 2025. The presidents of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan returned to Washington in February 2026 for the Critical Minerals Summit, with Uzbekistan penning a to bolster U.S. investments in the sector.
Some deals have already been made. In November, California-based Cove Capital a $1.1 billion, U.S. government-backed deal to develop two tungsten deposits in Kazakhstan, a sector where China controls 80 percent of global extraction. But the deal is yet to receive financing from the U.S. government.
Meanwhile, U.S. allies are also making headway in challenging Russia and China’s privileged position. Turkiye accounts for 11 percent of critical mineral exports, importing the of Uzbekistan’s copper and Tajikistan’s aluminum and manganese. Canada is the fourth largest importer of Central Asian critical minerals, the majority of which is uranium from Kazakhstan. Canadian companies are heavily invested in the sector. Cameco Corporation, which partners with Kazatomprom in the Inkai Joint Venture, operates the world’s fifth-largest uranium mine.
Central Asian governments are also taking tentative steps to improve their investment climates. Kazakhstan has introduced extensive amendments to its code “On Subsoil and Subsoil Use,” including over 100 changes aimed at improving transparency, digitizing licensing, and creating more and investor-friendly conditions, alongside new mechanisms such as electronic auctions and priority rights for strategic investors.
Without a sustained and coordinated push, the United States risks being locked out of one of the most consequential supply chains shaping the future of global power.