The Tianjin summit this year will be a a stress test for the group in three ways.
By and Saleem Abbas August 07, 2025 
Flags on display at the SCO leaders’ summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, July 4, 2024.
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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s 2025 summit is at Tianjin, China from August 31 to September 1. This year’s SCO summit is of high significance as many members of the group have been embroiled in wars and conflicts, undermining the very fabric of SCO multilateralism. From Russia, which remains entrenched in its three-year war in Ukraine, to Iran’s 12-day war with Israel, to the Pakistan-India cross-border strikes of 2025, four of the 10 SCO member states have been directly involved in military clashes in the past three months alone. These factors not only contribute to weakening the bilateral relations of the states involved but also serve as a litmus test for multilateral forums such as the SCO.
At the Tianjin Summit, the SCO, as a forum, will have to prove whether it can function as a credible platform for cooperation, or if it will succumb to the internal contradictions of its member states – an issue in the SCO’s proceedings for a very long time.
The SCO region has witnessed long-standing internal contradictions between the member states, especially since India and Pakistan joined the grouping in 2017. However, recent developments have escalated these contradictions to the point of conflict. During 2025, four SCO member states engaged in conflict, which intensified the internal contradictions of the SCO. Owing to Article 2 of the SCO charter, the organization refrains from any interference in the bilateral matters of member states, but the tensions between members have become a major challenge for the organization as a forum for multilateral cooperation.
One of the most important challenges for the SCO is the decades-long India-Pakistan rivalry, rooted in the Kashmir issue and terrorism concerns. The of 2019, and India’s subsequent revocation of Article 370, which granted Kashmir limited autonomy, intensified tensions, leading to diplomatic breakdowns and cross-border strikes by the two nuclear-armed states. In April 2025, tensions further escalated between the two states after a on tourists in Indian-administered Kashmir. Hostilities were reignited, which culminated in missile exchanges and the downing of several . Despite reaching a ceasefire after four days, the crisis between the two nuclear-armed states exposed the growing volatility in the region and the risks of miscalculation.
Notably, the SCO, whose stated purpose is “strengthening mutual confidence and good-neighborly relations among the member countries” and “making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security, and stability in the region,” was silent on the conflict.
A second case of conflict involving an SCO member state began on June 13, when Israeli forces carried out multiple strikes on Iran. Iran retaliated with missile barrages across Israel. The resulting war, which spanned over 12 days, brought major instability in the Middle East and exposed the volatility of the region. The SCO did . The group expressed “serious concern” and “strongly condemn[ed]” the Israeli strikes, which were described as “a gross violation of international law and the United Nations Charter” and “an infringement on Iran’s sovereignty.”
However, internal contradictions within the SCO became evident after India distanced itself from the organization’s statement, particularly due to the realignment of its foreign policy toward the United States and its longstanding partnership with . It is important to note that India is one of the largest buyers of Israeli military exports, and the states have seen warming relations since the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power.
The continued Russia-Ukraine war also has implications for the SCO member states. Nearly all of the SCO member states, such as India and China, have remained neutral in the Russia-Ukraine war and have called for restraint and a . However, since the eruption of war between Russia and Ukraine, a massive number of have been issued by the EU, the U.K., the U.S., and others, which makes it complicated for the SCO member states to proactively engage with Russia across multiple avenues of regional cooperation. Moreover, the issuance of against multiple Russian individuals, including President Vladimir Putin, requires intricate maneuvering for SCO member states that are signatories of the ICC but also want to maintain relations with Russia.
It would be too pessimistic to say that these conflicts have entirely handicapped the SCO’s abilities in conflict management and promotion of multilateral cooperation. Multilateral forums such as the SCO still provide a platform for quiet bilateralism, something evident from the recent of Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Chinese President Xi Jinping just ahead of the SCO foreign ministers meeting.
Despite the internal frictions, the SCO has the potential to keep up functional cooperation on counterterrorism, transport corridors, and energy dialogues among the member states. Economic cooperation persists among the member states via initiatives such as the and ongoing energy dialogue between the Central Asian republics and Russia. Additionally, Afghanistan – a shared focus of concerns over cross-border terrorism, narcotics, and human trafficking – is an area of common ground for the SCO members.
In terms of geopolitics, Russia actively utilizes the SCO to bypass the isolation posed by the Western world, and Iran relies on the forum to counter Western containment. Yet India also remains an active member of the SCO, despite its cooperation with the Quad and the United States. This depicts a flexibility among SCO member states, despite the sharp divergences in geopolitical leanings.
The Tianjin Summit will offer three major stress tests for the SCO. The first is whether the group can reach consensus on a joint statement, despite the member states’ conflicting interests. Having engaged in a recent conflict over accusations of state-sponsored terrorism, India and Pakistan are not expected to agree on a statement that implicates either one, as both blame the other for sponsoring terrorism on their soil. Additionally, India’s recent diplomatic inclination toward the U.S. suggests that it will refrain from any anti-West statement, whether reference to the Israel-Iran war or any other geopolitical issue.
The second stress test for the SCO is whether it can actively facilitate real diplomatic progress among states with conflicting interests. The sidelines of the summit provide a necessary backchannel for low-profile bilateral exchanges, which can produce positive results for the mounting tensions among the member states.
The third and the most important stress test for the SCO is the need for the forum to establish institutional depth and address the critique that is it mere pageantry without substance. The organization must move beyond symbolism to bring substance to its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) and bring about a funding mechanism for the economic corridors proposed by SCO members. The test lies in the fact that the present mechanisms are not fit for purpose. This was evidenced by past summits, which exposed structural gaps such as the complete absence of dispute resolution mechanisms and a weak secretariat.
The SCO does possess the ability to manage conflict and foster dialogue, but there is a need for recalibrated expectations. The SCO is neither the EU nor NATO. The multilateral forum should focus more on practical areas that offer collective value such as counterterrorism training, disaster relief, and digital infrastructure.
Additionally, there is a strong need for institutional reforms if the SCO wants to reach its goal of fostering regional stability. A mediation cell on a small scale, based upon the discreet facilitation of voluntary backchannel dialogue, could help address tensions while adhering to the SCO’s principles of non-interference. Second, RATS needs more transparency and inclusivity to enhance its impact. Third, there is a dire need to expand the budget for the SCO Secretariat and its analytical capacity. Finally, to avoid any contradictions among members, voluntary working groups on energy, transport corridors, and artificial intelligence should be formed, which would allow willing members to promote cooperation without the constraints of seeking full consensus.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization faces a defining moment. The unity it was meant to foster in the region is strained by conflict and rivalries involving member states. Despite past challenges, the continued functionality of the forum is an achievement in itself. The Tianjin Summit will address whether the organization will evolve into purposeful coordination in a world drifting toward severe fragmentation.