Now that the U.S. is siding with Russia, where does that leave Central Asia?
By Bimal Adhikari and Alida Begezhanova March 27, 2025 
Presidents Putin and Trump during a meeting in June 2019.
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Last month’s U.N. General Assembly 11th emergency special session – dedicated to the resolution of the war in Ukraine – illuminated a shift in support from the United States. The U.S. seems to have had a change of heart with the re-election of President Donald Trump and Resolution ES-11/7, which proposed a lasting and just in favor of Ukraine. The called for “the Russian Federation to… withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine” and for the “immediate cessation of the attacks on the critical infrastructure of Ukraine.”
Previously, the United States championed and led the coalition against Russia, but now it is siding with its historical adversary. Most recently, Trump had a with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which, in his words, was a “very good and productive” conversation. After that conversation an was reached between these two world powers for Russia to cease strikes on Ukraine’s infrastructure and energy grids; the agreement, however, appeared to be immediately ignored by Putin as more than 40 Russian drones Ukrainian civilian infrastructure in Slovyansk.
Trump’s approach is starkly different from the previous U.S. administration under Joe Biden. Since the very beginning of the war in 2022, Biden was very clear on where his heart lies, that Russia is “tearing at the very foundations of international peace and security.” His statement left no room for misinterpretation of his administration’s stance – a clear-as-day disapproval of Russia’s “violations.”
Besides statements, Biden met several times with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during his term, including a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the in Hiroshima, Japan, and in at the White House in Washington, D.C. The Biden administration was also adamant on to Ukraine, as well as restricting U.S. investment into Russia-supporting states, such as .
With the return of the Trump administration, however, support for Ukraine dwindled, as Trump pivoted to developing a mutually beneficial Russia-U.S. dialogue. Trump’s to blame Russia for the conflict, the March 4 decision to the provision of intelligence and military aid to Ukraine, and recent remarks – such as his declaration that “it [Ukraine] ” – all point to the Russia-supporting trajectory of the administration for the nearest future. Intelligence and military aid was , but the damage to the relationship is clear.
These new developments have larger implications that go beyond the war in Ukraine. As put by former Prime Minister of France , “America can no longer be considered an ally of Europe.” It has become one of three “illiberal superpowers,” along with Russia and China. Just exactly what does it mean for the U.S. – a historical torchbearer of democracy, liberalism, and liberty – to metamorphose into a freedom-denying illiberal state of unfathomable power?
It seems that the contemporary political scene’s resemblance to realpolitik is burgeoning with the return of the Trump administration. Hobbes’ “bellum omnium contra omnes” – or “the war of all against all” – is becoming a more and more relevant and accurate description of the current state of affairs as non-power-bearing states are forced to adjust to the (increasingly unpredictable) whims of superpowers such as the U.S. and Russia.
It is difficult to say what Central Asia’s response should be to this massive change of heart in Washington. Historically the U.S. has made efforts to strengthen its relations with Central Asia and distance the Central Asian states from Russia by creating the . This campaign was largely successful, with Central Asian states’ UNGA speeches becoming Russia-aligned in recent years.
Now that the U.S. is siding with Russia, however, where does that leave Central Asia? The Trump administration appears interested in continuing the C5+1 framework. Its aggressive pursuit of may be one of the factors that motivate it to maintain engagement with Central Asia. However, the administration’s disregard for democracy promotion could lead the region’s autocratic regimes to become even more repressive. As a result, their foreign policies may align more closely with the historic rivals of the U.S., such as Russia and China, both of which wield significant influence in the region.
In short, the future of Central Asia over the next few years remains highly uncertain. However, one thing is clear: this region has regained strategic importance with the change in U.S. leadership.